His central claim is that curiosity provides hope for a response-dependent or behaviour-centred explanation of the value of whatever curiosity involves or aims at. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. However, Grimm is quick to point out that defending one of these two similar views does not depend on the correctness of the other. Due to the possibility of overly simple or passive successes qualifying as cognitive achievements (for example, coming to truly believe that it is dark just by looking out of the window in normal conditions after 10pm), Pritchard cautions that we should distinguish between two classes of cognitive achievementstrong and weak: Weak cognitive achievement: Cognitive success that is because of ones cognitive ability. It is plausible that a factivity constraint would also be an important necessary condition on objectual understanding, but there is more nuanced debate about the precise sense in which this might be the case. DePaul, M. and Grimm, S. Review Essay: Kvanvigs The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 498-514. It is helpful to consider an example. On the one hand, we have manipulationists, who think understanding involves an ability (or abilities) to manipulate certain representations or concepts. Dordecht: Springer, 2014. and Pritchard, D. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 41(1) (2014): 63-109. Van Camp, W. Explaining Understanding (or Understanding Explanation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(1) (2014): 95-114. However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. Uses the hypothesis of extended cognition to argue that understanding can be located (at least partly) outside the head. However, Kelp admits that he wonders how his account will make sense of the link between understanding and explanation, and one might also wonder whether it is too strict to say that understanding requires knowledge as opposed to justified belief or justified true belief. However, Strevens nonetheless offers a rough outline of a parallel, non-factive account of grasping, what he calls grasping*. According to Goldman (1991) curiosity is a desire for true belief; by contrast, Williamson views curiosity as a desire for knowledge. Lucky Understanding Without Knowledge. Synthese 191 (2014): 945-959. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. However, epistemologists have recently started to turn more attention to the epistemic state or states of understanding, asking questions about its nature, relationship to knowledge, connection with explanation, and potential status as a special type of cognitive achievement. To the extent that such a move is available, one has reason to resist Morriss rationale for resisting Pritchards diagnosis of Kvanvigs case. This is a point Elgin is happy to grant. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. He claims further that this description of the case undermines the intuition that the writers lack of understanding entails the readers lack of understanding. Hills herself does not believe that understanding-why is some kind of propositional knowledge, but she points out that even if it is there is nonetheless good cause to think that understanding-why is very unlike ordinary propositional knowledge. ), The Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Achievements, unlike mere successes, are regarded as valuable for their own sake, mainly because of the way in which these special sorts of successes come to be. To defend the claim that possessing the kinds of abilities Hills draws attention to is not a matter of simply having extra items of knowledgeshe notes that one could have the extra items of knowledge and still lack the good judgment that allows you to form new, related true beliefs. and (ii) what qualifies a group of beliefs as a system in the sense that is at issue when it is claimed that understanding involves grasping relationships or connections within a system of beliefs? Contains Kims classic discussion of species of dependence (for example, mereological dependence). Zagzebski (2001) and Kvanvig (2003), have suggested that understandings immunity to being undermined by the kinds of epistemic luck which undermine knowledge is one of the most important ways in which understanding differs from knowledge. Discusses whether intellectualist arguments for reducing know-how to propositional knowledge might also apply to understanding-why (if it is a type of knowing how). Knowledge in a Social World. Morris (2012), like Rohwer, also defends lucky understandingin particular, understanding-why, or what he calls explanatory understanding). An overview of wisdom, including its potential relationship to understanding. Goldman, A. An overview of the background, development and recent issues in epistemology, including a chapter on understanding as an epistemic good. Hills (2009) is an advocate of such a view of understanding-why in particular. For that reason, these will be addressed before moving on to the more explicitly epistemological concerns. Meanwhile, he suggests that were you to ask a fake fire officer who appeared to you to be a real officer and just happened to give the correct answer, it is no longer plausible (by Pritchards lights) that you have understanding-why. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. For, even if understanding why 22=4 does not require a grasp of any causal relation, it might nonetheless involve a grasp of some kind of more general dependence, for instance the kind of dependence picked out by the metaphysical grounding relation. Grimm develops this original position via parity of reasoning, taking as a starting point that the debate about a priori knowledge, for example, knowledge of necessary truths, makes use of metaphors of grasping and seeing that are akin to the ones in the understanding debate. Elgin, C. Z. For example, Kvanvig (2003: 206) observes that we have an ordinary conception that understanding is a milestone to be achieved by long and sustained efforts at knowledge acquisition and Whitcomb (2012: 8) reflects that understanding is widely taken to be a higher epistemic good: a state that is like knowledge and true belief, but even better, epistemically speaking. Yet, these observations do not fit with the weak views commitment to, for example, the claim that understanding is achievable in cases of delusional hallucinations that are disconnected from the facts about how the world is. Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. View Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. Grimm (2012) has wondered whether this view might get things explanatorily backwards. If we consider some goalsuch as the successful completion of a coronary bypassit is obvious that our attitude towards the successful coronary bypass is different when the completion is a matter of ability as opposed to luck. If so, why, and if not why not? Divides recent views of understanding according to whether they are manipulationist or explanationst; argues for a different view according to which understanding is maximally well-connected knowledge. Analyzes Kvanvigs Comanche case and argues that knowledge and understanding do not come apart in this example. Elgin, C. Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 33-42. It also allows attributions of understanding in the presence of peripheral false beliefs, without going so far as to grant that understanding is present in cases of internally consistent delusionsas such delusions will feature at least some false central beliefs. Includes Alstons view of curiosity, according to which the epistemic value of true belief and knowledge partially comes from a link to curiosity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Contains the paradigmatic case of environmental epistemic luck (that is, the fake barn case). In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. This paper proposes a revisionist view of epistemic value and an outline of different types of understanding. Hills, A. Kvanvig (2003; 2009) offers such a view, according to which understanding of some subject matter is incompatible with false central beliefs about the subject matter. Explores understanding as the proper goal of inquiry, in addition to discussing understandings distinctive value. The advances are clearly cognitive advances. Thus, given that understanding that p and knowing that p can in ordinary contexts be used synonymously (for example, understanding that it will rain is just to know that it will rain) we can paraphrase Zagzebskis point with no loss as: understanding X entails knowing that one understands X. The distinctive aspects can be identified as human abilities to engage in mathematics and intellectual reasoning. Riggs, W. Why Epistemologists Are So Down on Their Luck. Synthese 158 (3) (2007): 329-344. Morris, K. A Defense of Lucky Understanding. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2012): 357-371. Since, for instance, the ideal gas law (for example, Elgin 2007) is recognized as a helpful fiction and is named and taught as such, as is, nave Copernicanism or the simple view that humans evolved from apes. Assume that the surgeon is suffering from the onset of some degenerative mental disease and the first symptom is his forgetting which blood vessel he should be using to bypass the narrowed section of the coronary artery. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. (For example, is it a kind of knowledge, another kind of propositional attitude, an ability, and so on? Outlines a view on which understanding something requires making reasonable sense of it. Grimm (2011) suggests that what we should regard as being understood in cases of objectual understandingnamely, the object of the objectual attitude relationcan be helpfully thought of as akin to a system or structure [that has] parts or elements that depend upon one another in various ways.. . Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution Some (for example, Gordon 2012) suggest that attributions of propositional understanding typically involve attributes of propositional knowledge or a more comprehensive type of understandingunderstanding-why, or objectual understanding (these types are examined more closely below). Questions about when and what type of understanding is required for permissible assertion connect with issues related to expertise. Pros and cons of epistemology shift Changes in epistemology even though they have received several criticisms they have significantly played a critical role in the advancement of technology. Epistemology is the study nature of human knowledge itself. Considers some of the ramifications that active externalist approaches might have for epistemology. What is it to have this ability to modify some mental representation? Having abandoned the commitment to absolute space, current astronomers can no longer say that the Earth travels around the sun simpliciter, but must talk about how the Earth and the sun move relative to each other. Bradford, G. The Value of Achievements. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(2) (2013): 204-224. Argues that requiring knowledge of an explanation is too strong a condition on understanding-why. Section 5 considers questions about what might explain the value of understanding; for example, various epistemologists have made suggestions focusing on transparency, distinctive types of achievement and curiosity, while others have challenged the assumption that understanding is of special value. For example, in Whitcomb (2011) we find the suggestion that theoretical wisdom is a form of particularly deep understanding. This consequence does not intuitively align with our practices of attributing understanding. A more sophisticated understanding has it that human beings and the other great apes descended from a common hominid ancestor (who was not, strictly speaking, an ape). Description Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. bella vista catholic charities housing; wills point tx funeral homes; ptvi triathlon distance; is frankie beverly in the hospital; birria tacos long branch; Looks at the increasing dissatisfaction with ever-more complicated attempts to generate a theory of knowledge immune to counterexamples. The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 57-69. Pritchard, D. Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value In A. OHear (ed. 0. For example, by trusting someone I should not have trusted, or even worse, by reading tea leaves which happened to afford me true beliefs about chemistry. Goldman, A. Unsurprisingly, the comparison between the nature of understanding as opposed to knowledge has coincided with comparisons of their respective epistemic value, particularly since Kvanvig (2003) first defended the epistemic value of the latter to the former. His alternative suggestion is to propose explanation as the ideal of understanding, a suggestion that has as a consequence that one should measure degrees of understanding according to how well one approximate[s] the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. Khalifa submits that this line is supported by the existence of a correct and reasonably good explanation in the background of all cases of understanding-why that does not involve knowledge of an explanationa background explanation that would, if known, provide a greater degree of understanding-why. He wants us to suppose that grasping has two componentsone that is a purely psychological (that is, narrow) component and one that is the actual obtaining of the state of affairs that is grasped. Given the extent to which grasping is highly associated with understanding and left substantively unspecified, it is perhaps unsurprising that the matter of how to articulate grasping-related conditions on understanding has proven to be rather divisive. This is of course an unpalatable result, as we regularly attribute understanding in the presence of not just one, but often many, false beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Consequently, engaging with the project of clarifying and exploring the epistemic states or states attributed when we attribute understanding is a complex matter. CA: Wadsworth, 2009. Some of Pritchards (for example, 2009) earlier work on understanding uses the terminology atomistic understanding as synonymous with understanding-why and indeed his more recent work shifts to using the latter term. As such, Khalifa is not attempting to provide an analysis of grasping. The medical epistemology we propose conforms to the epistemological responsibility of doctors, which involves a specific professional attitude and epistemological skills. For example, Hills (2009: 4) says you cannot understand why p if p is false (compare: S knows that p only if p). But is understanding factive? Resists Pritchards claim that there can be weak achievements, that is, ones that do not necessarily involve great effort. In recent years epistemology has experienced gradual changes that are critical in human life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Defends the strong claim that propositional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for understanding. Consider here two cases she offers to this effect: EVOLUTION: A second graders understanding of human evolution might include as a central strand the proposition that human beings descended from apes. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. For a less concessionary critique of Kvanvigs Comanche case, however, see Grimm (2006).